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ABSTRACT 
 
The Political-economic and Demographic Causes of Metropolitan Income Inequality and 
Its Components. (May 2009) 
Xi Chen, B.A., Renmin University; M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Mark Fossett 
 
This research project examines variations in inequality in individual earned 
incomes across U.S. metropolitan areas. The main analysis includes thirteen explanatory 
variables from three major perspectives – the political economy perspective, the 
demand-side perspective and the labor force supply-side perspective. In addition, I 
applied path models to explain causalities between some independent variables and used 
the decomposition of the Theil index to show the between-group effects. The results 
indicate that most demand-side and supply-side factors significantly contribute to 
variances in metropolitan income inequalities, while the impact of political economic 
factors are very limited.  
The paper is organized in the following manner: Chapter I is the introduction; 
Chapter II reviews literature focusing on the level of earning inequality and its 
predictors; Chapter III describes data and measures of variables; Chapter IV introduces 
statistical methods (including OLS regression model, path analysis, and decomposition 
of the Theil index); Chapter V presents the results of OLS regression model and its 
explanations; Chapter VI explains path analysis and decomposition analysis and their 
 iv
results; and finally, Chapter VII discusses the current research project and its 
implications  for future studies.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Inequality in income distribution is a topic of longstanding interest to sociologists 
and other social scientists. It has obvious importance in its implications for the 
distribution of social well-being and life chances. Accordingly, it has been the subject of 
study and theorizing by sociologists from many perspectives ranging from neo-Marxist 
class analysis (Wright 1979, Wright and Perrone 1977) to neo-Weberian analysis 
(Parkin, 1979; Weeden, 2002) and the status attainment perspective (Blau and Duncan, 
1979, Sewell, Haller, and Ohlendorf 1970; Solon 1992).  
 
Overview of Income Inequality 
Income inequality is a crucial indicator of stratification, economic development, 
and many other aspects in society. At the individual level, differences in income can be a 
cause or a consequence of educational and occupational achievement (Hauser, 
Featherman 1974; Blau and Duncan 1979; Solon 1992), personal wealth (Shapiro, 
2004), and even choice of residential location (Massey and Fischer 1999; Jargowsky 
1996). At the societal level, income inequality is associated with industrialization 
(Kuznets 1955), gender inequality (McCall 2000a), immigration (Borjas 1982, 1985; 
Stolzenberg and Tienda 1997; Poston 1984), health conditions (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2006, Kawachi etc. 1997), as well as class and racial inequality (Wright 1978, Wright  
____________ 
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and Perrone 1977, Wilson 1997), and family structure (Treas and Walther 1978). 
 
Recent Trends and Patterns in Income Inequality 
Income inequality is viewed as an important subject because of its dynamic 
nature across time and space. In the U.S., the trend in income inequality since World 
War II can be divided into two distinct time periods (Ryscavage, 1999).  During the first 
period (1947-1973), overall income distribution was relatively consistent, with 
inequality slightly rising during economic downturns and slightly declining during 
economic expansions (Ryscavage, 1999). However, inequality in both family and 
individual income began to increase rapidly in the late 1970s. The U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Current Population Survey (CPS) data shows that the Gini index for family income 
inequality was fairly stable, around 0.37 from 1947 to 1973, but increased from .356 to 
.425 between 1973 and 1996 (Ryscavage, 1999). Individual income inequality also rose 
over 20% from 1965 to 2005 according to the Gini index (see Figure 1.1).   
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Figure 1.1 Trend for U.S. Individual Income Inequality 
 
 
Many researchers and theorists have viewed these trends and patterns with 
concern. Douglas Massey (1996), in the article “The Age of Extremes,” has warned that 
rising income inequality contributes to geographic concentration of affluence and 
poverty in urban areas. The spatial concentration of affluence reinforces the privilege 
and power of the rich, while as the density of poverty increases, the poor face more 
crime, disease, and family dysfunction, therefore “creating a deeply divided and 
increasingly violent social world” (Massey 1996, P.395). Furthermore, compounded 
with urbanization and natural population growth, income inequality escalates even faster 
in some developing countries such as Mexico, China, and India (Massey 1996, 
Firebaugh 2003).  
In the U.S., as the dominant industrial form shifts from manufacturing to service, 
the labor market appreciates “soft skills” more than physical strength (Levy, 1998). As a 
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result, inequality continues to increase due to the growing economic premium on 
education and skills and “a winner-take-all market in which the very highest incomes 
grow enormously while all other income stagnates” (Levy 1998, P.77). Furthermore, 
unemployment in inner city ghettos has reached record levels, exacerbating social 
inequality and its subsequent negative consequences, threatening the fabric of American 
society (Wilson, 1996).  
Income distribution also varies greatly across geographic locations. For example, 
at the global level, national income inequality grew in all regions except for Africa. 
Specifically, income inequality doubled in Eastern Europe over the last four decades and 
from 1980 to 1995 it rose over 20% in some Asian countries (Firebaugh, 2003). In the 
U.S., income inequality also varies from state to state. For instance, in 1990, the Gini 
index of family income in New Hampshire was 0.387, while it was relatively high at 
0.475 in Mississippi (Volscho, 2005). Across U.S. counties inequality varies because of 
counties’ considerable differences in economic infrastructure, demographic profile, and 
level of prosperity (Nielsen and Alderson, 1997).  Between the 1960s and the early 
1980s, a number of cross-sectional studies have examined income inequality across 
states (Aigner & Heins 1967; Al-Samarrie &Miller 1967; Conlish 1967; Formby and 
Seaks 1978; Hylack 1980; Jacobs 1985; Singh & Sale 1978, Langer 1999) and across 
U.S. metropolitan areas (Betz 1972; Burn 1975; Danziger 1976; Farbman 1975; 
Garofalo & Fogarty 1979; Hirsch 1982; Maume 1983; Nord 1980; Sakamoto 1988). 
According to information from Metropolitan Quality of Life Data at Harvard University, 
the Gini index of income inequality in the largest 100 U.S. metropolitan areas in 1999 
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ranged from 0.48 for New York City to 0.37 for Nassau-Suffolk area (See figure 1.2). 
Such a large variance in inequality across metro areas brings up pertinent questions as to 
why these inequalities exist, and why a variance in the inequalities exists. This is in part 
what the current project is attempting to answer.   
 
 
Income Inequality-Gini index, 1999
New Orleans, LA
Miami, FL
McAllen--Edinburg--
Mission, TX
New York, NY
Nassau--Suffolk, NY
San Jose, CA
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
0.43
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
MSA Gini index
Figure 1.2 U.S. Metropolitan Income Inequality for the Year 1999 
 
  
Surprisingly, neither the recent increase nor the spatial variance of income 
inequality has received much attention from sociologists in the last decade. To shed new 
light on the subject, the goal of this study is to understand various forces and factors that 
shape income distribution across metropolitan areas and evaluate their relative 
importance from a sociological and economic point of view.       
 6
 
Causes for Income Inequality 
Sociologists and economists have examined the potential causes of income 
distribution for several decades. Most studies can be grouped into three broad 
perspectives. The first perspective emphasizes political-economic factors, such as public 
policy, federal or state laws, interest groups, class conflict, and workers’ organizations. 
Concerning income inequality in particular, union density (Beck 1980, Rubin 1988, 
Leicht 1989, Freeman, 1997, Gustafsson and Johansson 1999), right-to-work laws 
(Moore and Newman 1985, Ellwoood and Fine 1987, Abraham and Voos 2000), the 
minimum wage (Danziger and Gottschalk 1995, Freeman 1996, Diego and Wodon 2004, 
Volscho 2005), and public education system (Glomm and Ravikumar 1992, Wilson 
1996) are among the most frequently mentioned variables.  
The second and third perspectives are derived from fundamental ideas in 
economics – the demand and supply sides of the labor force. Demand-side theories 
emphasize the structural opportunities of jobs and particularly examine factors such as 
industrial and occupational structure (Kuzent, 1955, Freeman 1977, Levy 1998, Wilson 
1996, 1997, Bluestone 1990, Gustafsson and Johansson 1999), size of the public sector 
(Gustafsson and Johansson 1999, Hinrichs and Lyson 1995, Volscho and Fullerton 
2005), unequal treatment of racial groups (Gwartney and Long, 1978, D’Amico and 
Maxwell 1995, Darity, etc. 1997, Darity and Mason 1998, , Hamilton 2000, Coleman 
2003) and structural and cyclical unemployment (Gustafsson and Johansson 1999, 
Nielsen and Alderson 1997) on job availability and differences in wages.  
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In contrast, the supply-side argument claims that inequality is produced by the 
distribution of characteristics across individuals in the labor force. For example, it is 
argued that heterogeneity in talent, motivation, and human capital (Thompson 1965, 
Burn 1975, Freeman 1997, Mincer 1974, Sullivan, 2006), immigration (Stolzenberg and 
Tienda 1997, Reed 2001, Chiswich 1978, 1986, Bojas 1982), and age and racial 
composition (Bollen and Jackman 1985, Nielsen and Alderson 1995, 1997) generate 
variation in income compared to a homogenous population in the above categories. In 
addition, the non-linear effect of demographic characteristics on income inequality has 
been explained by the logic of Kuznet’s curve (Nielsen, 1994). That is, for two groups 
that differ in income, inequality is greatest when they are equal in size and lower when 
one of the two groups predominates.  
While individual studies examine relevance of particular factors, most studies do 
not consider all factors together, or quantitatively compare their importance in affecting 
inequality, nor suggest the most compelling argument among them. What is missing is a 
broad picture that includes all major theories and hypotheses and an empirical test of 
their relative strength. Therefore, this study sets out to accomplish this goal by 
addressing inequality in income across U.S. metropolitan areas with U.S. census data.    
 
Measure of Income Inequality 
To determine income inequality one needs define income first, because the 
calculation of inequality can be very sensitive to how income is measured (Ryscavage 
1999).  The value of income inequality could be higher if the definition of income 
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includes salary, wage, dividends, retirement pension, interests received from investment 
such as stock, and nonmonetary transactions such as health insurance, Medicare and 
Medicaid, which are over-proportionately received by the rich. Conversely, the value of 
income inequality could be lower if certain redistributive transfers such as welfare 
payment, public assistant, Supplemental-Security income, veterans’ payments, 
unemployment compensation, subsidized housing, and food stamps are included in 
incomes of the poor (Ryscavage 1999). Most empirical studies that investigate inequality 
use either individual earnings or relative loosely defined monetary income as the 
measure of income, depending on researchers’ interest. Earnings from work such as 
wages and salaries generally constitute the largest part of income. With respect to factors 
of production, earnings are viewed as the return to labor (Ryscavage 1999). Since this 
study focuses on inequality generated through labor market structure and dynamics, the 
concept of income used here refers to labor market earnings, or earned incomes.   
In measuring income inequality, this study uses the Theil index. Of the five 
popular inequality indexes (squared coefficient of variation, Gini index, Theil index, 
mean logarithmic deviation, and variance of logged income), only the Theil and mean 
logarithmic deviation satisfy the criteria of scale invariance, additive decomposability, 
principle of transfers, and welfare principle (Firebaugh 2003, P. 80). The additive 
decomposition of Theil inequality measure is used, where appropriate, because of its 
property of separating out within-group and between-group components. The 
comparison of weighted and unweighted between-group components can also help 
demonstrate how population distribution influences the values of inequality.  
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Another contribution of this study is to seek the factors that could influence the 
decomposed between-group component of inequality measures. Prior research has 
compared multiple popular inequality measures, such as the Gini index (Nielsen, 1994), 
the Variance of Logged Earnings (Sakamoto, 1988), or the Atkinson index (Volscho and 
Fullerton, 2005), but paid less attention to the components of inequality. According to 
Duncan (1966), the decomposition of dependent variables makes it possible to “compute 
the relative contribution of components to variation in the composite variable and to 
ascertain how causes affecting the composite variables are transmitted via the respective 
components” (Duncan 1966, P.7).  
 
Future Implications 
Income inequality has risen in the most populous nations, such as China, India, 
the former USSR, and the U.S. The growth in inequality in developing countries can be 
viewed as a result of their economic liberalization, while causes of inequality growth in 
the U.S. and Western European countries are more complicated (Firebaugh, 2000, Levy 
and Murnane 1992). However, most nations do not document data as sufficiently and 
accurately as the US Census does, thus creating barriers to investigating growing 
inequality in other nations. In this study, the knowledge obtained by examining an 
integrative conceptual framework and applying advanced techniques will be instructive 
in future investigation that seek to explain income inequality in other countries. 
Furthermore, as urbanization processes speed-up rapidly all over the world, the present 
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study focusing on U.S. metropolitan areas in particular also could help forecast the 
dynamics in inequality in urban settings at the global scale, as well.  
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CHAPTER II  
PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on income inequality with three goals 
in mind. One is to document the level, geographic variation, and trend in income 
inequality established by previous research. The second is to identify factors that are 
considered to be important in explaining the level and variations in income inequality 
within previous literature. The third is to develop the current study’s hypotheses to be 
tested in this study.  
 
Patterns and Trends 
Several scholars have provided a thorough review of historical trends in 
inequality in earned income in the post-war period in the U.S. Levy and Murnane (1992) 
briefly reviewed U.S. male earnings inequality during the last 150 years1, and 
documented detailed changes in three consequential periods: 1970-82, 1983-87, and the 
post-1987 period. The first period (1970-82) was marked with stable inequality but 
falling experience and education premium due to the entrance of baby-boom cohorts into 
the labor force (Levy and Murnane 1992). The second period (1983-87) was the period 
of declining middle-class jobs and polarization between the rich and the poor. The 
particular political and economic environment during the early 1980s – tax rate 
reductions for the top brackets due to the Economic Recovery and Taxation Act in 1981 
                                                 
1The description of male earning inequality during the period between the Civil War and the early 1950s is 
reviewed in Levy and Murnane’s work. 
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and a high unemployment rate during the economic downturn, contributed to the 
continuing increase in inequality. As academic interests on the subject resurged, 
different theoretical arguments started focusing on the demand-side factors. Perhaps the 
most influential work among them was Bluestone and Harrison’s deindustrialization 
theory (1982). But the fact that vanishing of middle class jobs and rising inequality 
occurred within both manufacturing and service industries suggests that the argument 
based on sectoral shift cannot fully explain rising inequality (Levy and Murnane, 1992). 
During the last period (1988-1991), earning inequality among males kept growing, 
despite a recovery in the economy and a decline in the effect of baby-boomers (Levy and 
Murnane 1992). Freeman (1976) suggested the post-1979 rise in education premium as 
an explanation, but it still cannot explain growing inequality among workers with similar 
schooling and experience, and in the same age groups (Levy and Murnane 1992).           
Ryscavage (1999) divided the trend in earning inequality since post- WWII into 
two periods: 1947-1973 and 1973-1996. He described that inequality in the first period 
was relatively consistent, slightly increasing or declining according to economic growth 
and recession, respectively. Ryscavage’s (1999) work gave more attention to the 
inequality trends during the second period, especially the differences in earning 
inequality between males and females. The general conclusion is: 
Over the 1970s and 1980s the amount of dispersion in the earnings distribution 
had increased, especially for men. For women, earnings inequality appeared to be 
on a gradual decline in the 1960s and 1970s, but then began to increase during 
the 1980s (Ryscavage, 1999 Pp101).    
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 On the topic of between and within-group inequality across education and age 
groups, the gap in earnings between the more-educated and less-educated men was 
larger in the 1980s than in the 1970s (Levy and Murnane 1992; Ryscavage, 1999). 
Among male workers who had a high-school diploma, earnings of older workers relative 
to younger workers were changing more favorably over the 1971-89 period. Among 
college-educated workers, the earning differential related with experience rose during 
the 1970s but stagnated in the 1980s. During the 1990s, the forces that generated greater 
earning inequality were still present. While the early 1990s was a period of stabilization 
in income inequality, the Gini index of income inequality for year-round full-time 
individual workers rose sharply between 1993 and 1995 according to U.S. Census data.         
Income inequality also varies across geographic locations. Between the 1960s 
and the early 1980s, a number of cross-sectional studies have examined income 
inequality across states in the U.S. (Aigner & Heins 1967; Al-Samarrie &Miller 1967; 
Conlish 1967; Formby and Seaks 1978; Hylack 1980; Jacobs 1985; Singh & Sale 1978). 
Langer (1999) examined the Gini index of household income inequality across states 
based on both Census and CPS data from 1949 to 1989. Louisiana had the highest level 
of income inequality (0.472) while New Hamphire had the lowest level (0.381) in 1989.  
Over time, different patterns in the level of income inequality emerged. Some states, 
including New York, California, Louisiana, and Delaware, had a steady increase in 
income inequality. Other states showed a cyclical change in income inequality, such as 
Nebraska and Virginia (Langer, 1999). Importantly, the variation across states and over 
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time observed in the Gini index was found significant and not caused by sampling error 
(Langer, 1999).       
Other cross-sectional studies have examined inequality across metropolitan areas. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, some researchers found a positive relationship 
between city size and income inequality level (Hirsch 1982; Maume 1983; Nord 1980; 
Garofalo & Fogarty 1979; Betz 1972). The emphasis in more recent literature has shifted 
toward explaining income inequality between- or within- population groups and the 
causes in socioeconomic infrastructure. For example, McCall (2000a, 2000b) analyzed 
the widened within-group inequality across gender and education categories in counties 
with a population over 100,000. The relevance of metropolitan racial composition to 
income inequality has become a popular research topic as well (Chakravorty 1996; 
Cohen 1998, 2001; McCall 2000b). In addition, more scholars have started paying 
attention to the impact of industrial sectors and economic infrastructure on income 
distribution (Bluestone 1990; Neilson and Lorence 1988; Sakamoto 1988; Belman etc. 
1996; Volscho and Fullerton 2005; Lorence 1991; Sanchez 2002).         
 
Causes of the Variation in Inequality 
This section reviews research findings on three major perspectives on income 
inequality. First, based on the political economic perspective, I examine the impact of 
unionization, Right-to-work laws, minimum wage, and public education on income 
inequality. Then, incorporating the demand and supply paradigm in economics, I group 
the possible causes of income inequality into the demand-side perspective and supply-
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side perspective. The demand-side factors include industrial structure, occupational 
structure, size of the public sector, racial inequality, and unemployment rate. The 
supply-side factors include the distribution of human capital, the size of immigrant 
population, ethnic composition and age structure of the labor force.  
Political Economic Variables 
 The political economic perspective emphasizes social structural factors related 
with public policy, federal and state regulations, and political and economic conflicts 
between interest groups. The following factors have been suggested as potential 
influences on income inequality: unionization, right-to-work (RTW) laws, the minimum 
wage, and the public education system.   
  
Unionization  
Unionization has been considered as an equalizing factor for income inequality. 
For example, the percentage of unionized workers in industrialized countries is 
negatively associated with the income inequality measure (Gustafsson and Johansson, 
1999).  Furthermore, the decline of trade unions in the most advanced industrial 
countries has contributed to increases in inequality (Freeman, 1997). Unions not only 
reduce inequality in income among union members by standardizing pay among them 
within industrial units, e.g. plant, factory, or firm, but also equalize pay across units and 
reduce inequality by narrowing the earning gap between blue collar workers and highly 
paid professionals and executives. Furthermore, unions can generate a threat effect that 
force nonunion firms to increase pay and benefits to avoid unionization (Leicht, 1989).   
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In the U.S., the decline in unionism from 30% in the private sector in the 1960s 
to 10% in 1996 has been a contributing factor in the rise in income inequality during this 
period (Freeman 1997). The possible causes for the decline in unionization include lower 
union response to the changing labor market environment (e.g. globalization and 
immigrantion), and a change in employer attitudes toward unionization. Most factories 
or firms treated unions as a crucial element of the American labor system before the 
1970s, but after the 1970s the employers’ attitude became more averse to unionism 
(Freeman, 1997). Free trade and subsequent large volumes of imported goods from 
foreign countries have substantively weakened the bargaining power of union workers in 
good-producing industries. Furthermore, excess supply in labor due to more immigrants 
has created a long-lasting replaceable labor source for firm owners and therefore made 
union’s effectiveness and influence fade. The empirical analysis on union effectiveness 
is extensive among literature in political science, especially on union’s interaction with 
class, race, and gender.  
 
Union and Education/Class 
While few studies have examined the association between unionization and 
income inequality among workers with differing education, some findings have 
suggested that unions serve as a divisive function among different classes (Rubin, 1988).  
For example, union density is positively associated with the redistribution of earned 
income from middle-class workers to both the most prosperous (the fifth quintile) and 
least prosperous (the lowest quintile) workers (Rubin, 1988). For the most prosperous 
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workers, “highly institutionalized unions with a highly skilled membership are able to 
extract greater economic gains from their employers than other unions or nonunionized 
labor” (Rubin 1988, P.563). For the less-skilled workers, unions may increase income 
inequality between unionized and nonunionized members (Form, 1985). However, the 
union threat effect can also raise the earnings of unorganized workers, and therefore 
reduce the inequality among unskilled workers (Leicht, 1989).  Thus, unionization could 
have different impacts on between-group inequality than compared to within-group 
inequality.  
 
Unions and Racial Inequality 
Beck (1980) listed two perspectives on unionization and racial inequality. The 
first perspective argues that unions function as a tool of a white working class to protect 
their social status and economic power by excluding racial minorities from its 
membership. Therefore, increasing unionization will hypothetically widen income 
inequality between white and non-white workers, while reducing inequality among white 
workers. The second perspective suggests that since unions provide solidarity and 
economic gain to both white and non-white workers, increases in unionization will 
reduce both between- and within-race inequalities. The results of time series data from 
1947-74 suggest that decline in unionization reduces white-nonwhite income inequality, 
while increases in unionization reduce inequality among white workers but increase the 
inequality among nonwhite workers (Beck, 1980).    
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Unionism and Gender  
 Narrowing gender gap in unionization has reduced 7 percent in the wage 
inequality between males and females in Canada during 1981-1988 and one-seventh of 
the total decline in gender wage gap in the private sector in the U.S. during 1973-1988 
(Doiron and Riddell 1994). While in Canada narrowing of gender unionization was due 
to increasing female union members, in the U. S. narrowing gender unionization was 
caused by a faster decline in male union members than female union members. Thus, 
changes in union density could have different effects on male and female income 
inequality.     
 Although unionization may influence total income inequality in many different 
ways, the general idea revealed by the above studies is that the union reduces the income 
gaps between workers. In this study in particular, I will test the hypothesis (H1) that the 
degree of unionization has a negative impact on income inequality in U.S. MSAs.     
  
Right-to-work (RTW) Law   
 A right-to-work law is a state law that bans union security. As a government 
regulation, RTW laws have both direct and indirect effects on income inequality. While 
no direct impact of RTW laws have been tested with data, studies suggest that states 
with lower wages are more likely to pass an RTW law (Moore and Newman 1985).  
Passing a RTW law in Louisiana and Idaho has significantly increased the state’s 
shareholders’ wealth by 2-4% (Abraham and Voos 2000), but no significant increase in 
income of working- class workers has been mentioned. If RTW laws uphold the number 
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of workers who work at low wages and provide higher returns to the rich, metropolitan 
areas located in the states that have RTW law could have higher income inequality than 
those without such laws. Thus I hypothesize (H2) that passing RTW laws increases 
overall income inequality.        
  Studies also show that passing RTW laws is relevant to unionization. On the one 
hand, RTW laws have negative effect on the extent of unionization. On the other hand, 
the extent of unionization in a state also has a significant negative effect on the 
probability of a state passing RTW laws (Moore and Newman, 1985).  Studies treating a 
RTW variable as exogenous found that RTW laws have a significant negative effect on 
state unionism (Moore and Newman, 1985). Regardless of the debate on the causal 
effect of RTW laws on unionization, most studies found that passing RTW laws and 
reduction in unions go hand in hand (Ellwoood and Fine 1987, Moore Newman 1985). It 
seems that both unionization and RTW law are the factors that influence the possibility 
of workers to bargain with employers, although unions may have a larger impact on 
workers’ income than RTW laws and therefore exert more influence on income 
distribution.        
 
Minimum Wage 
 The minimum wage can potentially influence income inequality as well. 
According to Danziger and Gottschalk (1995), the minimum wage was fixed in nominal 
terms at $3.35 per hour between 1981 and April 1990. However, its real value declined 
by 44% during this period due to rising inflation. Since the average wage also increased 
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modestly, the real minimum wage fell from 46% of the average wage in 1981 to 35% in 
1989 (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1995). Thus, while the nominal value of minimum wage 
had increased, its real value in the early 1990s was well below that of the 1970s 
(Danziger and Gottschalk, 1995, p.129). As a result, this decline in minimum wage has 
been partially responsible for the increased earning inequality during the 1980s and a 
crucial factor for declined earning among young people, immigrants, and those with low 
education.  While the minimum wage could explain the increased income gap between 
population groups, it has limited influence on income inequality among prime-age 
college graduates (Danziger and Gottschalk 1995). 
 Institutional economists also suggest that minimum wage serves to redistribute 
economic outcome and therefore reduces income inequality (Volscho, 2005). By setting 
a standard price, minimum wage increases the pay of the lowest-paid workers and limits 
the profits for others (Freeman, 1996). Since the consumers of the products of minimum 
wage workers and stakeholders are potential payers for the increasing minimum wage, 
“the higher the level of the minimum wage, the greater are the potential redistributive 
benefits” (Freeman, 1996, P. 648).   
 Although a higher minimum wage appears to have some have at least some 
inequality-reducing effect, its net impact is influenced by the share of low-skilled 
workers (Diego and Wodon 2004). For example, the impact of changes in minimum 
wage is relatively small in a country such as the U.S., where only a small proportion of 
workers are affected, than compared to a developing country with a large share of 
workers earning a minimum wage (Diego and Wodon, 2004). In the U.S., states set their 
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own minimum wages. From this perspective, it would follow that states with a higher 
minimum wage will have lower income inequality (H3).    
 
Public Education System   
 Public education systems can reduce the inequality by providing equal quality of 
education for all students regardless of the social standings of their parents. Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1992) compared two regimes of public schools and private schools and 
found that “income inequality declines faster under public education than under private 
education.” Although research on public education and income distribution is limited, 
William Julius Wilson has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the quality of public 
schools on educational experiences of children who grow up in poor neighborhoods 
(Wilson 1996, 1997). Wilson’s goal is to promote policy reform, but it suggests that 
uneven public education across neighborhoods and cities would influence income 
distribution by creating different proportions of highly-educated, less-educated, and non-
educated populations.   
 
Demand-side Variables 
 The demand-side theories claim that income inequality reflects the distribution of 
structural opportunities that the market can offer to the labor force. In other words, 
demand-side factors are those that affect how many jobs are available in various 
industrial and occupational categories. The most widely discussed demand-side factors 
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in studies on income inequality include industrial and occupational structure, size of the 
public sector, racial inequality caused by discrimination, and unemployment rate.   
   
 
Industrial Restructuring 
As a driving force of industrial restructuring, deindustrialization process 
influences the distribution of workers across all industries, which in turn affects income 
distribution among workers.  For instance, both increasing job opportunities in finance, 
investment, real estate (FIRE) and technology-oriented industries and declining job 
opportunities in manufacturing industries has widened the income gap between white-
collar workers and their employers and between professionals and craft workers. A study 
focusing on 16 countries has shown a significant relationship between the level of 
inequality and the sector composition of the economy by pointing out that a decrease in 
the industrial sector fosters inequality while the large size of the public sector reduces 
income inequality (Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999).  
The association between industrial development and inequality has formerly been 
described as an inverted-U shape of the Kuznets Curve. Kuznet’s theory states that while 
an economy with a large low-paying agricultural sector and a small high-paying 
industrial sector produces relatively low inequality, inequality gradually increases as the 
population flows from agricultural to industrial sector, then peaks, and finally decreases 
as industrial jobs dominate the labor force (Kuzent, 1955). Cross-national analysis has 
provided empirical support for this hypothesis.  However, since the 1970s, industrialized 
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countries such as the U.S. and the U.K., have moved beyond the prediction of Kuznets’ 
curve and entered a new inequality-climbing phase. This inequality growth in the post-
industrial period has been labeled as Great U-turn by economists, which not only 
occurred in terms of variance in wage but also in real average wage, and among many 
demographic groups in all regions of these countries and different industrial sectors 
(Bluestone, 1990).   
During the post-industrial period, as the market demand shifted from 
manufacturing goods to services, information, and technology, labor composition 
adjusted correspondingly. On the one hand, many middle-class jobs provided by 
manufacturing industries disappeared. On the other hand, the shift to the service sector 
created some high-paying and some low-paying jobs, which produced even greater wage 
dispersions.  As a result, “there were fewer jobs for autoworkers and more jobs for 
hamburger flippers”, and such redistribution of the labor force influenced overall 
inequality even if the wages paid within each industry remained unchanged (Danziger 
and Gottschalk, 1995). 
Another important theory, the dual-economy theory, examines the influence of 
industrial structure on the nature of work, how much a job pays, and job security. 
According to this theory, all firms are divided into two networks: the “core” and the 
“periphery” (Hodson and Kaufman 1982). Firms belonging to the “core” are usually 
large in size, corporate and bureaucratic, highly integrated through ownership and serve 
broad markets (Averitts 1968, p.7). Jobs provided by such firms are generally 
contractual, stable, and highly paid (Sullivan, 2005). Conversely, firms in the 
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“periphery” are relatively smaller, self-employed, and operate in restricted markets 
(Averitts, 1968). Accordingly, such firms provide short-period, unstable, and low-paying 
jobs (Sullivan, 2005). The impenetrable labor market barriers between the core and the 
periphery blocks upward mobility of workers moving between job positions and 
therefore sustains the stratified economic structure and income distribution among 
workers.      
Rising global economy and international competition constitute another cause of 
structural shift in the post-industrial society (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1995).  
International trade, especially with less developed countries (LDC), could contribute to 
problems of unemployment and increasing low-wage workers within more developed 
countries (MDC) and therefore lead to higher income inequality within MDC (Freeman, 
1977).  
Information technology as an emerging industry during the 1990s in the U.S. also 
could influence inequality in income. The NASDAQ composite index, heavily 
influenced by high-tech stocks, rose from 776.80 to 4,696.69, an over 600% increase, 
between January 1994 to February 2000 (Galbraith and Hale 2003). As high-tech firms 
gain more profit, their employees may receive higher wages than those in other 
industries. During the information technology bubble (1994-2000), the U.S. cross-county 
income inequality increased 48%, the largest inequality growth since 1969 (Galbraith 
and Hale 2003). Uneven distribution of technology industry across geographic locations 
has contributed to between-county differences.  Comparing inequality levels between 
1994 and 2000, “the big gains occur around areas of the county known to have a high-
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tech emphasis (e.g. Sicilon Valley, Seattle, and Boston), while losses occur in rust belt 
counties (Flint MI, Clevland OH) and counties heavily reliant on tourism (Honolulu)” 
(Galbraith and Hale 2003, P.9). Above theories point out that industrial restructuring that 
happened in post-industrial period lead to increases in income inequality. In other words, 
the process of deindustrialization seems to increase inequality (H5).  
  
Occupational Structure  
 Similar to industrial restructuring arguments, theories related with occupational 
structure also emphasizes the impact of macroeconomic change on the labor demand. 
While the shift occurred between manufacturing and service industries can influence the 
distribution of jobs, what types of jobs are provided within an industry is a separate 
question. Advances in technology requires more technical training, skills and education 
in workers of certain occupations, regardless of the nature of the industry. For example, 
the earnings in the service sector range from the minimum wage in fast food restaurants 
to extremely high pay for others such as physicians (Levy 1998, P.60). Furthermore, 
occupational structure also involves supply-side factors. The growth in college graduates 
and technically skilled workers has not kept up with the market demand for such 
workers, which in turn leads to higher premium for education and skills. Thus, the 
interplay of demand- and supply-side factors generates a polarized occupational 
structure and unevenly-paid jobs.   
Levy (1998, P.14) specified five groups of occupations that are directly 
associated with individual earnings. They are high-skilled and highly-paid workers (e.g. 
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mangers, administrators, scientists), other white-collar workers (e.g. sales clerks, 
officers), high-skilled blue-collar workers (e.g. craftsman, machines and equipment 
operators), low-skilled service workers (e.g. cooks, custodians, barbers), and farmers and 
workers in farm-related occupations. Such detailed typology more accurately 
demonstrates the stratification of jobs than the simple division of the “core” versus the 
“periphery,” or manufacturing versus service proposed by theories focusing on industrial 
restructuring. It has been documented that the earning distribution of a particular race 
and sex group is closely related to the types of jobs that the group predominately holds 
in the occupational structure (Levy, 1998).    
A more detailed occupational classification is suggested by the hourglass 
economy argument, that emphasizes abundance of jobs at the top and bottom of the 
occupational distribution but few jobs in the middle. Estimating hourly wages by the 
most detailed occupational categories available in each of the three censuses (1950, 
1970, and 1990), Massey and Hirst (1999) generated over 200 “occupational wages.” 
Over this period, the changes in the shape of the distribution of occupational wages 
among men corroborate the hourglass metaphor, but it does not apply to the distribution 
among women (Massey and Hirst 1998).  Therefore, I hypothesize that the more 
stratified occupational structure generates higher income inequality in metropolitan areas 
(H6).  
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Public Sector Employers  
 In addition to the changes in industrial and occupational structure, labor 
economists and industrial sociologists also emphasize the importance of public sector 
employment on income distribution (Hinrichs and Lyson, 1995).  
 Increasing jobs from government employers could reduce income inequality for 
several reasons (Volscho and Fullerton 2005). First, government employers not only can 
set a ceiling on the wage of workers at higher levels, but also pay more than private-
sector employers for low-skilled workers (Volscho and Fullerton 2005). Second, 
government employers are more likely to hire women and minorities than private-sector 
employers (Volscho and Fullerton 2005; Peters 1985). Additionally, once hired, women 
and minorities face less wage discrimination for working for government employers than 
working for private-sector employers. Therefore, the share of workers in government 
sector in MSA labor force could potentially influence income distribution among 
workers. Using three measures of the proportions of government sector workers, 
Volscho and Fullerton (2005) found that the size of the public sector negatively 
correlates with the income inequality in metropolitan areas. In this analysis, I will retest 
this hypothesis, namely, the more jobs in the public sector, the lower income inequality 
of a MSA (H7).  
 
Racial Inequality 
Another possible demand-side factor is racial income inequality that partially 
caused by discrimination in the labor market. Structural or individual discrimination 
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potentially reduces the earned income relative to whites for the disadvantaged groups 
who have similar education, experience, and job performance. However, whether 
currently racial inequality in the U.S. is caused by discrimination has been debated 
among both sociologists and economists. On the one hand, scholars have collected data 
from content analysis, court cases, audit studies, and used the residual method and 
Blinder-Daxaca decomposition as evidence of the impact of discrimination on individual 
economic outcomes (Darity, Mason 1998). On the other hand, some economists argue 
that pre-market factors play a more important role in explaining the racial income gap 
(Heckman 1998, Neal and Johnson 1996). Using the Armed Forces Qualifying Test 
(AFQT) score measured among high school students, Neal and Johnson (1996) show 
that the majority wage differential between blacks and whites can be predicted by AFQT 
scores measured before the respondents entered the labor market, but critics argue that 
the AFQT itself is racially biased. Some economists also argue that the explained 
difference used in the residual method is not equal to discrimination but, instead, are 
equal to the human capital variables that are not included in the model (Follett, etc, 
1993).     
Another group of scholars suggest that the impact from both individual 
characteristics and employment discrimination coexist. Gwartney (1978) examined the 
relative earnings of eight racial and ethnic minority populations living in U.S. urban 
areas during the 1960s and 1970s, and found that while the earnings ratio between 
minorities and whites increased during this period, the magnitudes and source varied 
considerably. For instance, the large improvement in relative earnings of Japanese, 
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Filipinos, and Chinese was due to their improved personal characteristics and 
endowments, but the relative earning gain among Blacks and Puerto Ricans was a result 
of reduction in racial differences in both human capital and discrimination (Gwarteny, 
1978). Since it is difficult to measure the inequality caused by racial discrimination, I 
simply use a measure of income inequality between black and white, which can be 
produced by labor market discrimination, but also can be influenced by other factors that 
cannot be attributed to labor market discrimination. I expect the racial income inequality 
will have positive effect on the metropolitan total income inequality (H8).     
 
Unemployment 
Macroeconomic fluctuations can also affect income distribution. 
“Unemployment is more likely to hit those at the bottom of the income distribution 
harder than others, therefore unemployment has an inequality-generating effect” 
(Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999, page 587). However, in their own research, 
Gustafsson and Johansson (1999) found no association between the unemployment rate 
and inequality. The weak relationship between the two could occur because income 
losses from unemployment are masked by unemployment benefits or by increases in 
labor market- orientated activity by other family members (Gustafsson and Johansson, 
1999).  
 Yet, other studies treat unemployment as a consequence of deindustrialization 
and globalization and international competition (Nielsen and Alderson, 1997). 
According to this argument, high unemployment caused by global forces will lead to 
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high income dispersion in developed countries, but Nielsen and Alderson (1997) found 
that a ambiguous effect of unemployment on and income inequality at the county level 
in the U.S. from 1970 to 1990.  As Gustafsson and Johansson (1999) suggested, other 
macro level processes, such as receipt of unemployment benefits, may have 
counterbalance effects.  Mocan (1999) also suggests that changes in structural (long-
term) unemployment has more significant influence on income inequality than changes 
in cyclical (short-term) unemployment2. Although previous literature didn’t find a 
significant association between unemployment and inequality, their theoretical 
propositions suggest there is a positive relationship. Therefore, I expect that increases in 
unemployment rate leads to higher income inequality (H9).  
 
Supply-side Variables 
The supply-side theories argue that income inequality reflects the unevenly 
distributed social characteristics, e.g. education, skills, and training among workers. 
Economic equality in a population is produced when the labor force is a homogenous 
group based on the above social characteristics. The most frequently discussed supply-
side factors that influence the level of income inequality include the distribution of 
human capital, the size of immigrant population, and population’s racial and age 
structures. 
  
                                                 
2 “An increase in structural unemployment is associated with an increase in the income share of the richest 
twenty percent of the population, and with a decrease in the shares of the bottom three quintiles… An 
increase in cyclical unemployment is associated with a reduction in the income share of the second 
quintile.” (Mocan, 1999, p128).  
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Human Capital  
Educational achievement, working experience, level of training and skills are 
often referred to as the indicators of human capital. The productivity of labor among 
individual workers is closely related to their human capital resources (Becker, 1975). 
Economic theory proposes that each individual intends to maximize his/her economic 
welfare and thus invest in their human capital stock. As a result, the difference in the 
returns to such individual investment reflects income differentials (Burn, 1975). The 
greater the variance in education, vocational training, talent and skill is in the population, 
the higher the income inequality (Thompson, 1965).  
  Previous research has suggested a link between variance in education and income 
inequality. According to Jan Tinbergen, a Nobel Prize-winning Dutch economist, 
inequality is generated by the race between the increasing demand for highly educated 
workers due to technology advancement and the increasing supply of these workers 
because of diffusion of higher education. The history of industrialized countries has 
shown that these two forces were compatible most of the time because the increase in the 
supply of skills often balanced the increase in the demand for skills (Freeman, 1997). 
During the 1970s, the increase in supply outgrew the increase in the demand for skills 
and therefore reduced educational premiums.  However, during the 1980s, the rate of 
students graduating from college decelerated and this led to increases in the wage return 
for the more educated (Freeman, 1997). Thus, the slowdown in the growth of the supply 
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of more educated workers relative to less educated workers is one of the factors that 
contributed to the increase in income inequality (Freeman, 1997).  
 Work experience represents the second major source of human capital, and is 
often measured by the number of years a person has worked in the labor market 
(Sakamoto, 1988). Workers’ productivity and earnings are enhanced by their additional 
experience and training. Therefore, the gap in “working years” between new workers 
and senior workers, controlling other factors, would generate wage differences.      
  Early human capital views suggested that individual data can generate 
aggregate-level relationships – greater difference in human capital leads to greater 
earning inequality (Becker and Chiswick 1966, Chiswick 1974). This method derived to 
Mincer’s (1974) “Human capital earnings function” in which earning inequality was 
explained by the variance in educational attainment, the variance in experience, and 
variances in rates of return, and other covariance. Based on the above literature, I expect 
that larger  variance in education among workers leads to higher income inequality in 
MSAs (H10).    
 
Immigration 
The increased racial diversity through immigration influences income 
distribution among individuals as well. While education is the most commonly used 
measure for human capital, language adequacy and racial/ethnic identity are 
conceptually part of the human capital framework (Sullivan, 2006). Recent immigrants 
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carry very different human capital profiles than those of native-born whites in terms of 
education, language skills, social network, and other social and psychological assets.  
Literature suggests that foreign-born populations can influence the wage 
structure in several ways. First, as more than one-third of the current foreign-born 
population do not have a high school diploma, they are more likely to bid down market 
wages for low-educated workers when competing with native-born whites with similar 
education for the same jobs (Reed, 2001). Second, low-paid minorities also bid up the 
wages of better-educated workers in certain industries that expanded with increases in 
populations, such as finance, investment, and real estate.  
Furthermore, language deficiency among immigrants also influences their 
earning. Stolzenberg and Tienda (1997) compared the economic outcomes of both 
Hispanic and Asian immigrants based on their English proficiency and education and 
found that the immigrants’ labor market disadvantage is determined by both their 
education and language. Immigrants with lower education and who do not speak English 
face the most severe discrimination and disadvantage (Stolzenberg and Tienda, 1977). 
The economic disadvantage of immigrants is so prevalent that it substantively influences 
a large share of the population at the bottom of the income distribution. In addition, 
increases in size and diversity of immigrant populations not only can increase the 
inequality between the native-born and immigrants but also influences inequality among 
non-white immigrants.  
A large volume of work has focused on the current Latin American and Asian 
immigrants’ labor market experience. Chiswich (1978, 1986) has documented the 
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significant labor market disadvantage of Mexican immigrants and the decline of such 
disadvantage with an increase in the time of residence in the U.S.. As racial disadvantage 
declined further, the earning cross-over between foreign-born and native-born 
population occurred around 15 years after the immigrants entered the U.S.. However, 
Bojas (1982) suggests that diverse immigrant groups have showed different patterns of 
economic achievement. Particularly, immigrants from Cuba have gained higher 
schooling within the U.S. and are economically better off than the immigrants from 
Mexico and Puerto Rico.  Bojas (1985) also pointed out that earning growth of 
immigrants over time is overestimated by cross-sectional data in Chiswich’s study 
because the recent immigrants since 1950 have lower working-related “quality”, such as 
education, than those of early immigrants. Still, literature has suggested the immigration 
increased income inequality during the late 1990s.  Thus, I hypothesize that a MSA with 
a higher immigrant population has higher income inequality (H11).  
 
Ethnic Demography 
Just as the population size of immigrants varies across MSAs, racial composition 
also constitutes a unique labor force supply factor for each metropolitan area. Compared 
to non-white racial groups, whites in the U.S. have historically obtained more human 
capital resources, especially in education. Since the civil rights movement, the increased 
opportunities in education and occupation for the non-white population have improved 
the groups’ socioeconomic standing. However, the social environment since the 1970s 
has not been able to completely remove the long lasting effect of racial discrimination 
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and economic disadvantage for people of color. As a result, metropolitan areas that have 
heterogeneous racial groups could have higher earning inequality than those that have a 
more homogenous population. For instance, percent of black population is found to be 
positively related with the variance of logged earnings among workers of a metropolitan 
area (Sakamoto, 1988). In addition, more Hispanics and Asians entered the U.S since the 
1970s, and “the foreign-born are more likely than the U.S.-born to live in metropolitan 
areas” (Kritz and Gurak, 2000, page 278). Therefore, I suspect that a MSA with racially 
diverse population has higher income inequality than a MSA with homogenous racial 
population (H12).  
 
Age Structure  
Because young adults and elderly people have relatively low income compared to 
middle-aged workers, the MSAs with larger proportions of young and elderly 
populations could have higher income inequality. Yet, little information could be 
obtained from previous studies at either the city or metropolitan level.  Literature on 
cross-national comparisons indicates that the proportion of the national population under 
age 15 is positively correlated with income inequality (Bollen and Jackman, 1985).  
In addition, the rate of natural growth in population is also positively associated 
with income inequality (Nielsen and Alderson, 1995, 1997), and such a relationship has 
been interpreted in terms of the impact of increases in population heterogeneity on 
dispersion of economic outcomes.  Thus I expect that a larger age variance among 
workers leads to higher income inequality (H13). 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND MEASURES 
 
 This chapter describes units of analysis, data collection and measures, and 
methods. First, I explain the units of analysis, sample size, and individual income data of 
the Census2000. Next, I compare the Theil index with other popular inequality measures 
in terms of their mathematical properties, and explain the decomposition function in 
detail. I then briefly describe the measure of each independent variable used in the 
analysis.    
 
Unit of Analysis 
 Why do I choose metropolitan areas as the unit of analysis? Because, income 
inequality varies across metropolitan areas, and this provides a good opportunity to test 
different theories that intend to predict variance in inequality. Second, the Census2000 
data shows that over 80% of the U.S. population lives in metropolitan areas, and we 
know from literature that many urbanites are non-white. The large size and diverse 
population makes it possible to consider the impact of demographical composition on 
inequality. Third, urbanization increases the concentration of poverty and the number of 
low-paying jobs, and meanwhile it creates groups of highly-paid professionals and the 
extremely rich. A large difference in income between groups of workers in U.S. 
metropolitan areas indicates its significance for an empirical study.  Finally, we can find 
a clear definition from the U.S. Census for a Metropolitan Statistical Area - an area 
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containing a recognized population nucleus with at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or 
more inhabitants and adjacent communities that have a high degree of integration with 
that nucleus. This makes the operationalization of variables and analysis more 
convenient.   
There are 297 metropolitan areas from Census2000 included in the analysis. The 
inequality measures in MSAs, and some other independent variables are calculated from 
individual data of Census2000 5 percent sample, while other independent variables (i.e. 
unionization) are obtained from other census or surveys.        
 
Individual Income Inequality 
Since I am interested in inequality that is closely related with labor market 
characteristics (e.g. labor demand and supply and its demographic composition), and the 
earning of individual workers is largely determined by these characteristics in a 
particular market setting, I use individual earning data to calculate income inequality.  
Although, literature on metropolitan inequality has used family income 
inequality, Sakamoto (1988) points out that family inequality has certain disadvantages 
in understanding the labor market mechanism, because family income inequality is not 
only determined by individual income within the family, but also by the number of 
family members, their age and demographic composition, household relationships 
among the family members, and financial resources other than income. However, 
individual income is able to reflect the influence of both demographic characteristics of 
an individual and political economic condition of a local market. Therefore, inequality 
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measured at the individual level would provide more accurate information without 
bringing in the “noise” factor of family structure.  The individual data in this study are 
obtained from the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples of US Census2000, and include all 
individuals residing in the 297 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), age equal to 
or over 16 years old, who are in the civilian labor force. There are 4,833,502 individual 
records used in the following analysis.  
  
Measure of Dependent Variable 
  I use the Theil index to measure the dependent variable - income inequality.  
Before introducing this index, I will explain the properties of several common inequality 
measures.  Measuring income inequality is more complicated than measuring income 
growth or gaps between units. Firebaugh (2003, page75) defines the standard inequality 
index as the measure of average disproportionality and can be expressed in the common 
form:    
I (Inequality Index) = ∑ f(ri)/N,  
Where N is the total number of cases, ri (ri= Xj/X-bar) is the income ratio for unit j, or 
the ratio of X for the jth unit to the average X for all units. Therefore, a measure of 
inequality is not only determined by the income ratio between individual and group 
means, but is also determined by the distribution of individuals among groups.  
  The most frequently used inequality measures in the social sciences are the Gini 
index, the Theil index, the Atkinson index, variance of logged incomes, and the mean 
logarithmic deviation. The criteria for evaluating these measures include the scale 
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invariance, principle of transfers, the welfare principle, and additive decomposability.  
Firebaugh (2003, p79-80) provides a thorough review of each criteria. To satisfy scale 
invariance requires an inequality measure not being influenced by income change of the 
same rate for all individuals in the population. In other words, inequality does not 
depend on the scale used. The principle of transfers means that the value of the measure 
decreases when money is transferred from the rich to the poor, but increases when the 
same amount of money is transferred from the poor to the rich. The welfare principle 
states that income transfer among the poor is more significant than income transfer 
among the rich. The additive decomposability requires that the value of overall 
inequality is a sum of weighted within-group inequality and weighted between-group 
inequality, given that everyone in the population is classified into mutually exclusive 
groups. Additive decomposability is not important when the interest of research is to 
simply describe the between-group inequality, but it is crucial to studies that investigate 
the overall inequality and components that construct such inequality.    
Of the five popular inequality indexes (squared coefficient of variation, Gini 
index, Theil index, mean logarithmic deviation, and variance of logged income), only 
the Theil and mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) satisfy all of the above criteria 
(Firebaugh, 2003, page 80). The Gini index satisfies the criteria of scale invariance and 
the principle of transfer but fails to obey the welfare principle and lacks 
decomposability. The variance of logged income does not satisfy the principle of transfer 
at the high income level, and the squared coefficient of variation does not satisfy the 
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welfare principle (Firebaugh, 2003). While Atkinson’s index satisfies the principle of 
transfers (Volscho and Fullerton 2005), it is not decomposable.   
Moreover, these inequality measures capture the changes in income distribution 
differently because of their unique mathematical attributes (Ryscavage 1999). The 
coefficient of variation is more sensitive to relative income changes among high-income 
individuals than among low-income individuals and therefore “more sensitive to changes 
in the upper end of the income distribution” (Ryscavage 1999, p.38). The variance of the 
logged income is more sensitive to the changes at the bottom half of the distribution than 
to the upper half, while the Gini and the Theil index are more sensitive to changes 
occurring in the middle of the distribution (Jarvis and Jenkins 1998). Finally, the formula 
of the Atkinson index contains an “epsilon,” a parameter that can be changed to adjust 
the sensitivity of the index by researchers. As the value of the epsilon increases, the 
index becomes more sensitive to changes taking place at the lower end of the 
distribution (Ryscavage 1999).  
The rationale to use the Theil index is its advantage of meeting all criteria of 
inequality measure and its sensitivity to changes that occur at the middle of the 
distribution. This index was initially proposed by the econometrician Henri Theil (1967, 
p.102). Its property of additive decomposability is crucial for the analysis in that it 
separates out between-group and within-group differences, such as gender, race, 
occupation, etc. Furthermore, the components of inequality obtained through 
decomposition can be used as dependent variables to test different hypotheses. Duncan 
(1966) has suggested that decomposition of dependent variables makes it possible to 
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“compute the relative contribution of components to variation in the composite variable 
and to ascertain how causes affecting the composite variables are transmitted via the 
respective components” (p.7). Finally, the “middle sensitive” attribute of the Theil index 
is beneficial for investigating the effects of a disappearing middle class, polarization of 
jobs in the service sector, and other causes suggested by both demand-side and supply-
side theories.  
 
Measures of Independent Variables 
Variables Based on the Political Economic Perspective 
 Unionization (Union coverage) – Union coverage is measured by the percentage 
of workers covered by unions in a MSA. The data is obtained from Union Membership 
and Coverage Database which is compiled from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
(Hirsch and Macpherson, 2003). 
 Right-to-work laws (RTW law) – information on state right-to-work laws is 
obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor (2006). The data is coded as a dummy 
variable, 1 indicating a state with RTWlaw in effect in 2000, while 0 indicates otherwise.  
 Minimum wage (Minimum wage) – Each MSA has been assigned the real value 
of state minimum wage in 2000. If the state law did not define a minimum wage, the 
MSA is assigned the 2000 federal minimum wage, $5.15. The information on state and 
federal minimum wage is also obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor (2007).    
 Public education system (public education) – Data and literature on public 
education system at the MSA level is limited. The Common Core of Data (CCD) of the 
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U.S. Department of Education provides total expenditure and total number of students in 
public elementary and secondary schools at the school district and MSA levels in 2000 
(Johnson, 2004), and I calculated the average expenditure (in thousand dollars) per 
student to measure the quality of public education.  
 
Variables Based on Demand-side Argument 
 Deindustrialization (production industry) – I use the percentage of workers in 
production industry from Census2000 data to measure the degree of deindustrialization.  
In other words, the higher the percentage, the less degree of deindustrialization in a 
MSA. According to the hypothesis that deindustrialization increases income inequality, I 
expect a negative sign for the coefficient of this variable.   
 Occupational structure (occupational differentiation) – The hypothesis states that 
a more stratified occupational structure leads to higher income inequality. To capture the 
occupational differentiation, I applied the first measurement mentioned in Gibbs and 
Poston’s article (1975): 
M=1-[∑X2/(∑X)2], 
where X is the number of workers in any single occupational category. The advantage of 
this measure is that it reveals both structural and distributive differentiation (Gibbs and 
Poston, 1975). The higher value indicates more differentiated occupational structure. 
The data is also derived from the Census2000.  
 Public sector jobs (public sector) – The data is obtained from Union Membership 
and Coverage Database (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2003).  The variable, public sector, is 
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measured as the percentage of workers in the public sector among all workers in a MSA 
in the year 2000.  
 Racial inequality (W/B income ratio) – I use a simple white to black mean 
income ratio from the Census2000 data to measure racial inequality. Literature has 
suggested that the income difference among racial groups can reflect the long 
established social discrimination faced by minorities, especially for African Americans 
(Blau, and Ferber. 1987; Daymont, 1980).   
 Unemployment (unemployment rate) – This variable is measured by the 
percentage of workers who are currently in the labor force but are not employed. The 
individual record of employment status is obtained from the Census2000.  
 
Variables Based on Supply-side Argument 
 Human capital (schooling variance)  – The variance in the years of schooling can 
be seen as an indicator of human capital dispersion. Since IPUM data only provides the 
categorical measure on years of schooling for individuals, I recoded this variable into 
numerical years (See Appendix.A), and then calculated its variance for each MSA.   
 Age structure (age variance) – This variable is measured as the variance of age 
of MSA labor force. The Census2000 provides individual age data at the year 2000.     
 Immigrant population (immigrants) – The census2000 also record individual 
immigration status.  I use the simple ratio between native born and foreign born 
population to measure the size of immigration populations, because such a measure 
shows a normal distribution, while the ratio of foreign to native born population shows 
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an abnormal distribution.  Responding to the measure, I expect a negative coefficient. In 
other words, the higher the ratio a MSA has, the less percentage of immigrant 
population, and the lower the income inequality.  
 Racial composition  (Racial diversity) – I use a multigroup entropy index to 
measure racial diversity (Michael White, 1986; Iceland, 2004). The higher value 
indicates a more diverse population. The IPUM data provides the single race 
identification data (racesing), which includes five racial categories – White, Black, 
American Indian, Asian or Pacific Islander, and other. The data also specifies the 
subcategory of Hispanic under the White category. Since American Hispanics are 
considered as a minority population in most sociological studies, I recode it as a separate 
category in my analysis. Thus, the entropy index used here is based on 6 racial 
categories.   
 
Measures of Control Variables 
To exclude effects of metropolitan population size and geographic locations, I 
add two control variables in the OLS regression, and both are calculated from IPUMS 
data:  
 Total population (log population) – The natural log of total population of the 
labor force is used to measure the size of the MSA.  
 Region (North) – A dummy variable is equal to 1 if a MSA is located in either 
the Northeast or in Midwest, otherwise it is equal to 0.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS 
 
OLS Regression 
I use ordinary least square (OLS) regression to test the hypotheses on income 
inequality. The preliminary analysis shows that the data has some heteroskedasticity 
problem, but not severe3. I will investigate this issue in future analysis. Since the model 
includes thirteen independent variables, I suspect that there is the problem of 
multicollinearity, and some independent variables may have indirect effects on income 
inequality. Therefore I incorporate the path model in the following section to address the 
causal effect among independent variables. Finally, one of the advantages of using the 
Theil index is to inspect the components of total inequality though decomposition. It can 
provide measures of within-group and between-group inequality. Thus, I include Theil 
decomposition at the end to examine how demographic configuration of the labor force 
influences inequality measures.    
 
Path Analysis 
Path analysis was first introduced to sociologists by Duncan (1966), and later 
Alwin and Hauser (1975) gave further explanation on total, direct, and indirect effects. 
The total effect of one variable on another is not their zero-order correlation, but the 
                                                 
3 For the OLS regression model that includes all variables, Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
for heteroskedasticity is significant at the level 0.01, but Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity is not significant.   
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association of the two not due to common causes; the indirect effects are the part of the 
total effect that are medicated by other variables; and the direct effects are the part of 
total effect that are not mediated by other variables (Alwin and Hauser, 1975). In other 
words, the total effect equals to the sum of the direct and indirect effects in the standard 
form. Path analysis can efficiently illustrate a causal model in a graph, especially the 
causes and the effects through the intervening variables. In addition, the computation of 
direct and indirect effects is relatively simple with the standard coefficients of OLS 
regression. Since in this study I intend to test multiple hypotheses and cover a broad 
range of independent variables, it is possible that some independent variables are 
correlated and have mediated effects on the dependent variable through other 
independent variables. Thus, applying path analysis is appropriate in that the direct and 
indirect effects on metropolitan income inequality can be simultaneously examined and 
easily compared.   
 
Decomposition of the Theil Index 
The Theil index is used here to measure metropolitan overall earned income 
inequality. Although the Gini index is a popular measure and has been widely used to 
describe the national and regional inequality trends over time, there are several 
advantages of using the Theil index in the present study:  1) the Theil index satisfies 
more criteria of the inequality measure than the Gini index (see the detailed discussion in 
page 38-39); 2) it is very easy to apply decomposition to the Theil index, while the 
decomposition of the Gini index is less consistent and can be mathematically 
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complicated (Yao, 1999); and 3) the Theil index is highly correlated with the Gini index. 
For instance, the correlation of the Theil index and the Gini index in my data is 0.976.  
The equation to calculate the Theil index is T = ∑ piri ln (ri), where the subscript i 
is used to underscore individual-level recode. Here pi = (1/N), where N is the 
metropolitan area’s total population, and ri is the income ratio of individual i (i’s income 
divided by the mean income for the metropolitan area) (for the details about the 
equation, see Firebaugh, 2003). Since the Theil index requires taking the logarithm of 
individual income, I add 1 (U.S. dollar) on incomes that equals 0.  The Theil index is 
zero when and only when the income ratio is 1.0 for all individuals. In other words, the 
Theil is zero under perfect equality. Figure 4.1 shows the histogram of the Theil index 
for total income inequality for 297 MSA areas. The variance of this variable is .003, with 
mean at .455 and standard deviation of .055.  
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Figure 4.1 Histogram of the Theil Index for Total Income Inequality 
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One of the most important qualities of the Theil index is its decomposability of the 
additive between-group and within-group components as follows: 
T = ∑ yi ln (yi /pi) + ∑ yi Ti  
Where j indexes population groups (for example, race), yi is the income share (group j’s 
total income as a proportion of total income for the entire population), and Ti is the level 
of inequality in group j as measured by the Theil index (Firebaugh, 2003). Specifically, 
when j indexes race, yi is a racial group j’s income as a proportion of total income in a 
metropolitan area, pi  is racial group j’s population share in a metropolitan’s total 
population, and Ti is the level of inequality within racial group j as measured by the 
Theil index.  
 Firebaugh (2003) pointed out that weighted and unweighted between-group Theil 
measures generate very different results.  The between-group inequality measure can be 
expressed in a general from: 
I= ∑ Wj* f(Rj),  
Where Wj indicates weight, R indicates income ratio between group-mean 
income and population-mean income. For unweighted inequality, Wj equals 1/N, where 
N denotes the number of categories. For weighted inequality, Wj equals Pj, where Pj 
denotes the population share for a category. Unweighted inequality is the simple average 
of f(Rj), telling us about the average difference between groups, i.e. male and female. 
However, weighted inequality is the population-weighted average of f(Rj), telling us 
average difference between individuals’ income ratios (Firebaugh, 2003, page 131). In 
other words, unweighted inequality is only determined by mean income of each group, 
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but weighted inequality is determined by both mean of group income and the population 
share of each group.  
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CHAPTER V 
OLS REGRESSION AND RESULTS 
In this chapter I first summarize the major hypothesis in the regression model, 
then provide the descriptive results for the measures, and finally report the results of 
OLS regression analysis.  
 
Hypotheses 
Based on literature reviewed earlier, I expect: 
1.  Unionization reduce overall income inequality; 
2. Passing Right-to-work laws increases overall income inequality; 
3. Higher minimum wage reduces overall income inequality; 
4. Better public education systems reduce overall income inequality;  
5. Deindustrialization increases overall income inequality; 
6. More stratified occupational structure increases income inequality;  
7. More jobs in the public sector reduce overall income inequality;  
8. Racial inequality increases overall income inequality;   
9. Higher unemployment rate increases overall income inequality;  
10. Larger variance in human capital among working population increases overall 
income Inequality; 
11.  Larger age variance among a working population increases overall income 
inequality;  
12. A large immigrant population increases overall income inequality; 
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13. A racially diverse population increases overall income inequality;  
 
Descriptive Analysis 
 Table 5.1 lists the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables.  
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics  
 Descriptive statistics 
 Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Theil index 297 0.455 0.055 0.324 0.666
Union coverage 233 14.324 7.742 0.600 38.200
RTW laws 297 0.421 0.495 0.000 1.000
Minimum wage 297 4.949 0.901 2.000 6.500
Public education 297 7.985 1.546 4.698 13.519
Production industry 297 0.151 0.048 0.057 0.343
Occupational 
differentiation 297 0.990 0.002 0.964 0.992
Public sector jobs 235 0.165 0.065 0.029 0.452
W/B income ratio 297 1.459 0.219 0.608 2.590
Unemployment 297 0.059 0.019 0.023 0.142
Age variance 297 182.378 10.414 151.159 218.325
Schooling variance 297 10.010 2.779 5.498 20.654
Immigrants 297 18.426 15.615 0.592 79.220
Racial diversity 297 0.558 0.234 0.083 1.203
Log population 297 9.073 1.015 7.492 12.254
North 297 0.423 0.495 0.000 1.000
 
OLS Regression Results 
 The results of OLS regression models are summarized in Table 5.2 to Table 5.3. 
Most independent variables have significant effects on the Theil index.  However, the 
amounts of variances in inequality explained by the three groups of variables are 
different.  Both demand-side and supply-side factors can explain over 50% of variance 
 52
in inequality by themselves, while the political-economic factors only explain 23%.  
Furthermore, almost all independent variables from demand and supply arguments are 
significant, while only one public economic variable in the full model is significant.  I 
explain the coefficient for each independent in detail in the following section.  
 
Table 5.2 Regression Coefficients of Independent Variables on Theil Index 
 
Political 
economic 
Demand 
side 
Supply 
side W/O control 
Full 
model 
Union coverage -0.000   -0.000 -0.000 
 (.000)   (.000) (.000) 
RTW laws 0.010   0.018** 0.012 
 (.010)   (.007) (.007) 
Minimum wage -0.001   -0.003 -0.005 
 (.004)   (.003) (.003) 
Public education 0.010**   0.001 0.004* 
 (.003)   (.002) (.002) 
Production 
industry  -0.502**  -0.425** -0.383** 
  (.072)  (.670) (.067) 
Occupational 
differentiation  -1.764  3.702** 3.178* 
  (1.472)  (1.300) (1.306) 
Public sector 
jobs  -0.119**  -0.147** -0.153** 
  (.046)  (.040) (.042) 
W/B income 
ratio  0.062**  0.038** 0.046** 
  (.013)  (.012) (.012) 
Unemployment  1.260**  1.283** 1.258** 
  (.172)  (.169) (.167) 
Age variance   0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 
   (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Schooling 
variance   0.012** 0.010** 0.010** 
   (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Immigrants   0.000* 0.001* 0.001* 
   (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Racial diversity   0.022 -0.019 -0.039* 
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Table 5.2 Continued 
 
Political 
economic 
Demand 
side 
Supply 
side W/O control 
Full 
model 
   (.014) (.015) (.016) 
Log population 0.006 0.005 0.003  0.003 
 (.003) (.003) (.003)  (.003) 
North -0.057** -0.022** -0.025**  -0.025** 
 (.010) (.006) (.005)  (.008) 
R2 0.226 0.524 0.545 0.674 0.692 
N 233 235 297 233 233 
*p<.05; **p<.01(two-tailed tests) . Standard error in parentheses.  
 
Table 5.3 Beta Coefficients of Independent Variables on Theil Index 
 
Political 
economic 
Demand 
side 
Supply 
side W/O control 
Full 
model 
Union coverage -0.043   -0.058 -0.025 
RTW laws 0.087   0.164** 0.105 
Minimum wage -0.024   -0.045 -0.08 
Public education 0.298**   0.042 0.121* 
      
Production industry  -0.402**  -0.342** -0.308**
Occupational 
differentiation  -0.070  0.147** 0.126* 
Public sector jobs  -0.143**  -0.177** -0.185**
W/B income ratio  0.240**  0.149** 0.178**
Unemployment  0.445**  0.456** 0.447**
      
Age variance   0.337** 0.227** 0.240**
Schooling variance   0.587** 0.546** 0.523**
Immigrants   0.118* 0.144* 0.141* 
Racial diversity   0.092 -0.078 -0.163* 
      
Log population 0.104 0.083 0.067  0.059 
North -0.517** 0.199** -0.225**  -0.224**
      
R2 0.226 0.524 0.545 0.674 0.692 
N          233 235 297        233 233 
*p<.05; **p<.01(two-tailed tests). 
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Political Economic Variables 
I tested four hypotheses from the political economic perspective. I expect that 
union coverage, minimum wage, and spending on public education have negative effects 
on income inequality, and that RTW law has a positive effect.  However, the coefficients 
of these variables in the OLS regression models are inconsistent.  Union coverage and 
minimum wage are not significant in any model, and RTW law is significant only in the 
model that includes all independent variables but without control variables. Spending on 
public education is significant in the political-economic-variable-only model and the full 
model. In short, the effects on income inequality do not seem to be straightforward, and I 
suspect there is a causal relationship among these independent variables.   
To inspect the problem of multi-collinearity, I included the correlation matrix, 
VIF and tolerance scores for all independent variables in the analysis (See table 5.4 & 
table 5.5). The results show a moderate correlation for four variables and low tolerance 
scores for RTWlaw and union coverage. One solution for multi-collinearity is to combine 
some variables.  Conceptually, both RTW laws and union coverage may directly relate 
to the degree of unionization, with the former as an obstacle and the latter as an 
outcome.  Technically, both unionization and minimum wage can be considered as 
indicators of workers’ strength, thus it is reasonable to combine the above three 
independent variables and create a new common variable – workers’ strength. Although 
public education is also based on the political economic perspective and moderately 
correlates with the other three, it does not belong to the same substantive issue shared by 
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the other three variables.  Thus, using factor analysis (Table 5.6), I created a new 
independent variable and named it workers’ strength.  
 
Table 5.4  Correlation among PE Independent Variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Union coverage 1.000    
2. RTW law -0.676 1.000   
3. Minimum wage 0.142 -0.296 1.000  
4. Public education 0.548 -0.558 0.120 1.000 
 
 
 
Table 5.5 VIF and Tolerance for OLS Regression Model with All Independent Variables     
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Schooling variance 2.74 0.365
RTWlaw 2.62 0.381
Union coverage 2.60 0.384
Racial diversity 2.57 0.389
Unemployment 2.42 0.414
Immigrants 2.31 0.433
Public education 1.98 0.505
Production industry 1.95 0.512
Occupational 
differentiation 1.79 0.558
Public sector jobs 1.57 0.638
W/B income ratio 1.52 0.659
Age variance 1.24 0.807
Minimum wage 1.19 0.839
   
Mean VIF 2.04 2.04
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Table 5.6 Factor Scores for Political Economic Independent Variables  
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness
Union coverage 0.734 -0.100 0.452
RTW law -0.785 -0.019 0.384
Minimum wage 0.293 0.200 0.874
Eigenvalue 1.240 0.051  
Difference 1.189 0.289  
R2 163.8**   
 
The results of these new variables, workers’ strength and public education, are 
shown in table 5.7.  As expected, the positive coefficient of workers’ strength supports 
the idea that a metropolitan area where workers have more power, including having 
more union members, facing no regulation from RTW laws, and benefiting from higher 
minimum wage, lowers overall income inequality.  
 
Table 5.7 Beta Coefficients of Workers’ Strength 
Variables W/O control Full model
Workers' strength -0.228** -0.177** 
Public education 0.054 0.125* 
Production industry -0.338** -0.301** 
occupational 
differentiation 0.149** 0.127** 
Public sector jobs -0.162** -0.155** 
W/B income ratio 0.146** 0.165** 
Unemployment 0.458** 0.45** 
Age variance 0.230** 0.242** 
Schooling variance 0.539** 0.518** 
Immigrants 0.153** 0.156** 
Racial diversity -0.069 -0.148* 
Log population  0.077 
North  -0.187** 
   
N 233 233 
R2 0.673 0.688 
*p<.05; **p<.01(two‐tailed tests). 
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The coefficient of public education is positive in the full model. This is opposite 
to what I expected. If higher expenditure per student in elementary and secondary public 
schools does reflect a better public education system, the result simply proves that the 
hypothesis is wrong, unless the measure is not a good indicator of public education 
system.  In that case, the possible explanation could be that many students who 
graduated from elementary/secondary public schools go to colleges and work in other 
cities or states. In other words, there is no direct link between elementary/secondary 
public education in a particular area and workers’ income in the same area. Therefore, 
the hypothesis does not hold at the city or metro level, but only can be tested at the 
regional or national level, assuming college graduates tend to find a job in the same 
region or nation where they went to college, or controlling for inter-city young adult 
migration. Further study on this topic is needed.   
 In sum, PE variables show promising but incomplete results. Early research 
suggests that workers as one social entity may gain their economic bargaining power 
together and reduce the income differences among them (Gustafsson and Johansson, 
1999).  However, such power or strength may be contingent on the extent of 
unionization and confined by state policies or regulations, as it is shown in this analysis. 
For the public education system, which is also heavily influenced by local policy and 
regulations, this effect on inequality does not confirm the conventional view or, at least, 
is inconclusive. 
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Demand-side Variables 
Table 5.2 shows that in the full model the coefficients for the five demand-side 
independent variables are all significant. As mentioned in Chapter II, theories, such as 
the Great U-turn (the extension of Kuznets’ curve), dual economy, globalization and 
information technology, suggest that the shift from the industrial to the post-industrial 
period, from manufacturing goods to providing service and information, increases 
income inequality. The negative coefficient of production industry provides support for 
the deindustrialization argument at the metropolitan level. Relevant to industrial 
restructuring is the increase in occupational categories. The distribution of earnings is 
suggested to correspond to the stratified occupations (Massey and Hirst, 1999). The 
result also supports this hypothesis as shown in its positive coefficient. The negative 
effect of public sector jobs is also consistent with earlier literature and my hypothesis; 
that is, the more jobs in the public sector, the less income inequality for a metropolitan 
area.  Finally, both racial inequality and unemployment rates show a consistent and 
positive impact on overall income inequality. Overall, data strongly supports all the 
demand-side hypotheses.  
One particular issue to be addressed here is an outlier case in the distribution of 
occupational differentiation. Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA has the lowest occupational 
differentiation score, 0.964, and the highest leverage score, 0.689 in the model. Actually, 
Visalia, CA is a very special case: it is the largest city and economic center of Tulare 
County, CA, one of the most productive agricultural areas in the U.S. Its market value of 
agricultural products sold ranked the second in 2002 among all U.S. counties (U.S. 
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Department of Agriculture, 2000). Compared to other metropolitan areas with a similar 
size of population, such as York, PA, Modesto, CA, and Reno, NV, occupational 
distribution of Visalia is heavily concentrated in the category of miscellaneous 
agricultural workers, including animal breeders.  Although this outlier has a large impact 
on the slope of this variable, the model is robust. Without Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, 
CA, the coefficient of occupational differentiation is still significant (5.46**), 
controlling for other independent variables.   
 
Supply-side Variables 
 On the supply side, as expected, coefficients of variance of schooling and 
variance of age are positive and significant, supporting the idea that heterogeneity in 
education and age among workers increases overall income inequality.  However, the 
variable of immigrants, measured as the ratio between native- and foreign-born 
populations, shows the sign opposite to the hypothesis. In other words, the data suggests 
that a metropolitan area with a larger native-born population and fewer foreign-born 
residents has higher income inequality.  More interestingly, racial diversity seems to 
have very little effect when other independent and control variables were controlled in 
the model and this coefficient is also opposite to my hypothesis. Literatures on 
immigrants, racial composition, and human capital have repeatedly suggested 
relationships among the three (Reed 2001, Stolzenberg and Tienda, 1977, Sullivan 
2006). It is likely there may be direct and indirect effects of immigrants on inequality 
through racial diversity or variance of schooling.  After considering the direct and 
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indirect effects of immigrants, racial diversity may show the expected positive 
coefficient.  To check this possibility, a path analysis is introduced in the next chapter.   
 
 61
CHAPTER VI 
PATH ANALYSIS AND DECOMPOSITION 
 In this chapter I first apply the path model to test the direct and indirect effects of 
demographic variables and then use the decomposition method to compare the weighted 
and unweighted between-group Theil inequality index in terms of gender, age, 
education, and race.  
 
Path Analysis and Its Results 
The OLS regression results show that most independent variables have the 
expected effects on income inequality, but, since the full model includes 13 independent 
variables, the problem of multicollinearity and causal relationship among independent 
variables may exist.  In Chapter V, I already addressed the multicollinearity problem 
among political economic variables with factor analysis. In this section I will apply path 
analysis to explain the supply-side demographic variables.  
The positive coefficient for immigrants and the negative coefficient for racial 
diversity in OLS regression are unexpected, and this suggests that their impacts on 
inequality may not be as straightforward as I hypothesized and could intervene or be 
intervened by other independent variables, e.g. variance of schooling. Conceptually, if a 
city has a large number of immigrants, its racial composition usually tends to be more 
diverse, which in turn can cause a larger variance in schooling among the population.  
Furthermore, an immigrant population itself tends to have large variance of schooling. 
Thus, both racial diversity and immigrant variables could have indirect effect on income 
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inequality through variance of schooling.  Following this logic, I incorporated the path 
model in the following manner (Figure 6.1).  When other independent variables are 
controlled, the total effect of the variable immigrant on overall income inequality is  
0.141+(-.344)*(-.163)+ (-.344)*(.192)*(.523)+ (-.330)*(.523)= -.01.  
And the total effect of racial diversity on income inequality is  
 -.163+(.192*.523) = -.063.  
 
 
               
          .000(.000)*     
   
         -.006(001)**      -.039(.016)** 
 Immigrants       Racial diversity                 Income inequality 
     2.331(.838)** 
         -.068(.012)**              .011(.001)** 
               Schooling variance        
 
*p<.05; **p<.01(two‐tailed tests). 
Figure 6.1 Path Model Coefficients with Standard Error in Parentheses  
 
 
 
 
               
            .141*      
  
   
         -.344**              -.163** 
 Immigrants       Racial diversity                 Income inequality 
     .192** 
                     -.330**            .523** 
                  Schooling variance 
*p<.05; **p<.01(two‐tailed tests). 
Figure 6.2 Path Model with Standardized Coefficients 
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 The path model shows that variable immigrants, measured as the ratio of native-
born to foreign-born population, and variable racial diversity have significant direct and 
indirect effects on overall income inequality. As expected, a larger native-born 
population reduces racial diversity (-.344**) and variance of schooling (-.330**), and 
high racial diversity increases variance of schooling (.192**), and variance of schooling 
has a large impact on income inequality (.523**). However, there are two coefficients in 
Figure 6.2 showing unexpected signs.  One is the direct effect of immigrants on the Theil 
index (.141*), and this coefficient indicates that a higher native-born population 
increases income inequality.  Another is the negative sign of racial diversity on the Theil 
index (-.163**), which means increased racial diversity leads to lower income 
inequality.  Logically, the large numbers of immigrant and non-white populations may 
influence other aspects of human capital distribution when variance of schooling is held 
constant, and therefore has a direct inequality-increasing effect.  Surprisingly, this 
analysis reveals an inequality-reducing effect conditioning on equal variance of 
schooling.  This is quite puzzling, since no study or theory has indicated increases in 
immigrants or racial diversity may reduce income inequality when variance in education 
of population is controlled. Furthermore, the two unexpected coefficients seem to 
support each other: a large share native-born population (measured by a simple ratio) 
increases inequality, and a racial diverse population (measured by the entropy index) 
reduces it (table 6.1).  
A possible explanation is that both variables have a non-linear effect on income 
inequality. However, I tested this possibility by adding the squared value of immigrants 
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and racial diversity in the model and found their coefficients are not significant either.  
So there may be other nonlinear relationships that I did not capture in this analysis. Why 
the two direct effects are opposite to the conventional beliefs will be an interesting 
question for future studies.    
 
Table 6.1 Beta Coefficients of OLS Regression for Path Analysis 
 Dependent variable 
Variables Theil index 
Schooling 
variance 
Racial 
diversity Theil index Theil index 
Union coverage -0.025 -0.151* 0.112 -0.104 -0.111 
RTW laws 0.105 -0.218** 0.040 -0.009 -0.012 
Minimum wage -0.080 -0.037 -0.064 -0.100* -0.096 
Public education 0.121* 0.051 -0.004 0.148* 0.149* 
Production industry -0.308** -0.145* -0.021 -0.384** -0.383**
Occupational 
differentiation 0.126* -0.289** 0.005 -0.025 -0.025 
Public sector jobs -0.185** 0.146** -0.020 -0.108 -0.107 
W/B income ratio 0.178** 0.083 0.239** 0.221** 0.206**
Unemployment 0.447** 0.105 0.397** 0.501** 0.477**
Age variance 0.240** -0.020 -0.150** 0.229** 0.239**
Schooling variance 0.523**     
Immigrants 0.141* -0.330** -0.344** -0.031 -0.010 
Racial diversity -0.163* 0.192**  -0.063  
Log population 0.059 0.140** 0.232** 0.132* 0.118* 
North -0.224** -0.040 -0.308** -0.246** -0.226**
      
R2 .692 .648 .659 .595 .594 
N 233 233 233 233 233 
*p<.05; **p<.01(two-tailed tests).  
 
Decomposition of the Theil Index 
Levy and Murnane (1992) have suggested that the shift in labor supply played a 
major role in between-group earnings between early 1970s to late 1980s, (e.g. increases 
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in male workers, young college graduates, and immigrants in the labor force contributed 
to the increase in inequality during this period).  Although their study focused on the 
trends of national inequality over time, it has an implication on the inequality across 
areas, because demographic composition of the labor force varies as it does for different 
time periods. The better way, or maybe an easier way, to understand how population 
composition influences calculating inequality is to apply the Theil decomposition 
technique to the data.  
Table 6.2 summarizes these demographic characteristics of the sampled 
population. All data is collected from Census2000 5% sample data. Sex variable is coded 
as male or female. Age is recoded into five categories (less than 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 
55 and over), based on the reported persons’ age in years as of the last birthday. 
Education reports the highest level of respondents’ educational attainment, including 
five categories - no high school diploma, high school diploma, some college or associate 
college degree, Bachelor’s degree, and Post-graduate degree. Race is reclassified into six 
categories according to the IPUMs single race variable (racesingd), including White, 
Hispanic, Black, Asian, Native American, and Other.  
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Table 6.2  Frequency Statistics for Demographic Variables 
  Frequency Percent Cumulativ
e 
Percentage 
Sex Male = 1  2,557,105 52.90 52.90Female = 2 2,276,397 47.10 100.00
Age 
Age less than 25 = 1 741,301 15.34 15.34
Age 25 to 34 = 2 1,097,251 22.70 38.04
Age 35 to 44 = 3 1,273,393 26.35 64.38
Age 45 to 54 = 4 1,057,219 21.87 86.26
Age 55 and above = 5 664,338 13.74 100.00
Education 
No high school diploma = 1 747,084 15.46 15.46
High school diploma = 2 1,207,904 24.99 40.45
Some college or associate degree = 
3  1,509,789
31.24 71.68
Bechelor's degree = 4 876,096 18.13 89.81
Postgraduate degree = 5 492,629 10.19 100.00
Race 
White  3,725,832 77.08 77.08
Hispanic  268,090 5.55 82.63
Black 563,963 11.67 94.30
Native American 30.869 0.64 94.94
Asian 237,213 4.91 99.84
Other Race 7,535 0.16 100.00
 
 
Figure 6.3 to Figure 6.6 illustrate the weighted and unweighted between-group 
income inequality based on gender, age, education, and race. Figure 6.4 shows that 
weighted and unweighted income inequality over age groups are highly correlated, 
meaning age distribution does not influence weighted between-age-group income 
inequality. In other words, population compositions of age across MSAs are relatively 
consistent.   
On the other hand, Figure 6.6 shows that race composition has the largest impact 
on weighted racial income inequality. For example, New York-Northeastern, NJ has a 
relatively low unweighted inequality, but since it has a diverse racial population (Whites 
only count for 55% of the total population), its weighted inequality becomes the highest. 
 67
On the other hand, Williamsport, PA has the highest unweighted between-group 
inequality, but 98.3 percent of its population is White, and its weighted inequality 
becomes much smaller. This graph also suggests that racial compositions across U.S. 
MSAs are highly inconsistent. 
For inequality in sex and education, unweighted and weighted numbers shows 
moderate correlation (correlation coefficient for sex is 0.619 and for education is 0.182). 
This implies population compositions of sex and education have to some extent, an 
impact on how we measure between-group income inequality.   
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Figure 6.3 Between-group Gender Income Inequality 
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Figure 6.4 Between-group Age Income Inequality  
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Figure 6.5 Between-group Education Income Inequality 
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Figure 6.6 Between-group Race Income Inequality  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The goal of this research project is to document the causes of income inequality 
in U.S. metropolitan areas. I started with reviewing three major perspectives and then 
developed thirteen hypotheses. The results of OLS regression models support most of 
my hypotheses and show strong effects of demand-side and supply-side variables4. The 
Beta coefficients indicates that schooling variance of the labor force has the largest 
impact on MSA income inequality (.523), followed by unemployment rate (.447), the 
size of production industry (-.308), age variance of the labor force (.240), public sector 
jobs (-.185), White and Black income ratio (.178), racial diversity (-.163), and immigrant 
population (.141). By contrast, political-economic independent variables have very 
limited effects. Only when three of its variables are combined together does the effect 
become significant. To a great extent, the regression analysis has efficiently answered 
my main research question.  The full model explains almost 70 percent of variance in 
dependent variables, and provides support for ten out of thirteen hypotheses.  
 However, including the large number of independent variables in one regression 
model is very likely the cause of the multicollinearity, as it is the case in the supply-side 
variables in this study. Since data show immigrant population, racial diversity and 
variance of schooling are moderately correlated, and literature has also suggested the 
                                                 
4 The results from the re-estimation of OLS regression on supply variables using the subsample of 233 
cases are fundamentally the same as those in Table 5.2. Therefore, the comparison of model fitness across 
regressions is valid.   
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causality among the three, I included a path analysis in Chapter VI to examine their 
direct and indirect effects on income inequality. The results clearly show that racial 
diversity mediates the effect of immigrants and that variance in schooling mediates the 
effects from both immigrants and racial diversity.  The path model also indicates that 
variance of schooling in metropolitan areas has the strongest direct effect, while the 
effects of other supply-side factors are comparably small, and most likely through 
variance of schooling. I am most concerned with the direct effects of immigrants and 
racial diversity for they seem to run contrary to my hypotheses. One possibility is that 
measurement error in immigrants and racial diversity lead to the unexpected findings, 
and another could be that the relationship between immigrants, racial diversity, and 
income inequality is simply not a linear one. If that is the case, the results of this project 
definitely casts some doubt on the conventional view of racial composition and 
inequality.       
 The final step of this study was to understand how population composition 
influences between-group income inequality. I compared the weighted and unweighted 
inequalities based on sex, age, education, and race groups. The main finding is that when 
between-group inequality weighted by group population size, racial composition 
changes the between-group inequality measure considerably, while age composition 
changes it slightly and gender and education composition changes it moderately.   
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Implications 
This research utilizes multiple data sources and statistical methods to investigate 
the causes of U.S. metropolitan income inequality around the year 2000. Although the 
main research question is simple, the results provide some significant implications for 
future studies. First, metropolitan income inequality is not determined by a single factor, 
but is involved with a variety of political, economic and demographic causes. Scholars 
from different fields usually focus on certain variables most relevant to their disciplines 
while ignoring other variables, but this study has given an excellent example of how to 
bring cross-disciplinary theories and concepts into a model which may result in better 
outcomes and improve our understanding on the subject.  
Second, the regression model shows that supply-side factors explain most 
variance in dependent variables, and that one supply-side factor, schooling variance, has 
the highest Beta coefficient among all independent variables. This finding suggests that 
changes in human capitals among working population could increase or reduce income 
inequality significantly when other causes are unchanged. Hypothetically, reducing 
schooling variance by providing workers more opportunities for higher education and 
training will be an effective solution for areas with high income inequality.       
Third, the findings from path model analysis cast doubt on the popular 
assumption that immigrant and racial diversity introduce inequality and suggest further 
study to address the relationship between these variables. The answer to the question 
why immigrants and racial diversity reduces inequality when schooling variance is 
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controlled can be provided by a specifically designed research project, but is beyond the 
scope of this study.   
Finally, decomposition analysis suggests that population composition can 
substantially change the value of between-group income inequality, and this effect is 
most significant for between-race inequality measures. In other words, using weighted or 
unweighted measures can lead to different results and interpretations for the same study. 
Thus, researchers should choose an appropriate measure most suitable to their research 
questions.    
There are also a few limitations of this study. The measures of some variables 
could be problematic in hypothesis testing. For example, the expenditure per student in 
public schools may not accurately measure the quality of public education system in a 
particular area, and therefore it is hard to draw the conclusion based on its coefficient. 
Unfortunately, I cannot find a better and more reliable data to measure this variable.  I 
am also concerned with the causal effects of immigrants and race on income inequality. 
There are several possible reasons for the unexpected results. The racial diversity 
measure cannot distinguish between certain types of low-diversity metropolitan areas. 
For instance, the majority of population in El Paso and San Antonia are Latinos, but in 
most other cities white is majority population.  Their racial diversity scores may have 
similar low or (medium) values, but the ethnic composition of the cities may have 
different implications for inequality.  Second, both immigrants and racial diversity could 
have unlinear effect on income inequality. As indicated in Kuznets’ Curve, when a 
variable is proportion (e.g. the degree of industrialization), its effect on inequality could 
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be U or inverted U shape. Obviously this study has not been able to give a clear answer 
on the effect of immigrants and racial diversity and further research may provide more 
information.  Finally, this study only used cross-sectional data, an approach that does not 
control for all possible causes of metropolitan income inequality. The analysis of panel 
data will be superior in that particular characteristics of metropolitan areas which are 
relevant to income inequality and persist over time can be controlled.  
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APPENDIX A 
RECODE IPUMS EDUCATION CATEGORY INTO YEARS OF SCHOOLING 
 EDUD99 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No school completed 39983 .8 .8 .8
1st-4th grade 22513 .5 .5 1.3
5th-8th grade 132904 2.7 2.7 4.0
9th grade 92727 1.9 1.9 6.0
10th grade 136160 2.8 2.8 8.8
11th grade 158346 3.3 3.3 12.1
12th grade, no diploma 164451 3.4 3.4 15.5
High school graduate, or 
GED 1207904 25.0 25.0 40.4
Some college, no degree 1166321 24.1 24.1 64.6
Associate degree, 
occupational program 343468 7.1 7.1 71.7
Bachelors degree 876096 18.1 18.1 89.8
Masters degree 324574 6.7 6.7 96.5
Professional degree 113030 2.3 2.3 98.9
Doctorate degree 55025 1.1 1.1 100.0
Total 4833502 100.0 100.0  
.  
Therefore, I recode this variable as: 
No school completed – 0 
1-4 grade – 2.5 (years of schooling) 
5-8 grade – 6.5  
9th grade – 9 
10th grade – 10 
11th grade – 11 
12th grade, no diploma – 11.5 
High school graduate, or GED – 12 
Some college, no degree – 13 
Associate Degree, occupational program – 14 
Bachelor degree – 16  
Masters degree – 16+2.5 = 18.5 
Professional degree – 16+8=24 
Doctorate degree – 16+7.5 = 23.5 
Hoffer, Thomas B. and Vincent Welch. 2006. “Time to Degree of U.S. Research Doctorate 
Recipients”. INFOBRIEF, NSF06-312. retrieved in March, 2008. 
(http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf06312/) 
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